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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs filed this suit seeking millions of dollars in damages based on Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless' (the "Parr Law Firm")1 communications and actions 
in representing its client against one of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit that settled years ago. 
Specifically, plaintiffs have sued the Parr Law Firm for various torts based on the Pan-
Law Firm's obtaining and implementing a discovery order necessary to preserve critical 
evidence for its client. 
Issue 1: Did the district court properly dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims based on 
the application of the judicial proceedings privilege where the Parr Law Firm's 
communications and actions were all made in the course of the underlying litigation and 
were based upon orders of the court? (R. 231-35; 354-57.) 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the granting of a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for correctness. 
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App 93, % 4, 22 P.3d 257. When considering a 
12(c) motion, however, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint, but 
"[l]egal conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as facts, are . . . not presumed to 
be true." Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999); see also Cayman 
Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(ccwell-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as 
true"). 
Issue 2: Did the district court properly dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims based on 
the application of the First Amendment privilege where the Parr Law Firm's 
communications and actions were all made on behalf of a client as part of the petitioning 
process to the government to redress a grievance? (R. 231-35; 354-57.) 
1
 The Parr Law Firm is now known as Parr Brown Gee & Loveless. 
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Standard of Review: The same as issue 1. 
Issue 3: Did the district court properly dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims based on 
its determination that the discovery order issued by the district court was not unlawful 
and that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from challenging the order? (R. 350-
54.) 
Standard of Review: The same as issue 1. 
Issue 4: Did the district court properly dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims based on 
the plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead all elements of each claim? (R. 235-40; 358-
59.) 
Standard of Review: The same as issue 1. 
STATUTES IMPORTANT TO THE APPEAL 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs Susan I. Moss and Jamal S. Yanaki ("plaintiffs") filed this case against 
defendants Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless and several of its lawyers 
(hereinafter collectively the "Parr Law Firm") in 2005. (R. 1-39.) All of plaintiffs' 
claims in this case arise out of the Parr Law Firm's representation of a client, lomed, Inc., 
in an earlier lawsuit filed against Mr. Yanaki for misappropriating trade secrets in an 
effort to unlawfully compete (the "lomed case"). (R. 41-72; 129-44.) The lomed case 
was settled in 2005. (R. 465.) 
In their Amended Complaint in this case, Ms. Moss and Mr. Yanaki asserted seven 
causes of action against the Parr Law Firm related to the Parr Law Firm's representation 
of lomed. (R. 129-44.) Count I of the Amended Complaint was for breach of a 
settlement agreement allegedly entered into between the Parr Law Firm and the plaintiffs 
in the lomed case. (R. 138-39.) Counts II through VII of the Amended Complaint were 
pled in the alternative to Count I and are all tort claims arising out of Iomed's seizure of 
computer-stored information and other documents from Mr. Yanaki pursuant to an order 
issued by the district court in the Iomed case. (R. 129-44.) 
Following the filing of an answer, the Parr Law Firm moved for dismissal of 
Counts II through VII of the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 223-81; 347-98.) In support of its motion, the Parr Law Firm made 
the following arguments: 
• Counts II through VII should be dismissed because each of them is based on 
acts and statements made by the Parr Law Firm as counsel in the Iomed case. 
As a result, each of the claims is barred by the judicial proceedings privilege, 
and each is barred by the rights of litigants and their counsel under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for the 
redress of grievances. (R. 231-35; 354-57.) 
• Counts II through VII should be dismissed because each of them is based on 
the argument that the Discovery Order (defined hereinafter) was unlawful. Not 
only was the Discovery Order not unlawful, but plaintiffs are barred under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel from challenging the Discovery Order because 
they failed to do so in the Iomed case. (R. 350-54.) 
• Counts II through VII should be dismissed because each of them fails to plead 
necessary elements of the cause of action. (R. 235-40; 358-59.) 
A hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings was held before the district 
court on February 15, 2007. (R. 465.) On March 20, 2007, the court issued a ruling on 
the motion. In its ruling, the district court held: 
This case centers around a discovery order issued by the court in the 
first action. Parr Waddoups received a discovery order allowing 
This case was originally assigned to Judge Leslie A. Lewis and was subsequently 
reassigned to Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, who issued the ruling that is the subject of this 
appeal. Later, the case was reassigned to Judge Joseph Fratto. 
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them to go into Yanaki's home and take information from his 
computer. The order was issued by a district court judge. The 
Petitioners claim this was a search and seizure under the criminal 
law and not a valid discovery order under the civil law. 
If Plaintiffs' position is accepted, then there could be no real 
discovery in a civil action of this nature. Iomed would have to give 
advance notice of the material to be discovered. If Yanaki had 
indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he would 
have ample opportunity to hide the material or destroy it. There is 
little reason to suppose that a person who would steal such things 
would not hide or destroy them to avoid being found out. 
2f: JJC :jc jfc 
The Plaintiff, Yanaki, should have objected to the supposed illegality 
of the discovery order in the initial Iomed case wherein he was sued. 
He never pressed an objection to that order. He settled the case so 
there was no appeal. It is, therefore, presumed that the discovery 
order was valid. . . . He had an obligation to challenge the order if he 
felt it was illegal or even improperly issued, especially since Iomed's 
case depended upon it. The Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from 
pursuing this claim. 
*r T* *F T* 
This Court must also recognize the Defendants' right to petition 
government. The parties to a lawsuit are subject to the doctrine of 
judicial privilege. The judicial proceedings privilege "is based upon 
a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the 
utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients." 
Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955). 
(R. 465-68.) On or about May 7, 2007, the court entered judgment on the dismissal of 
Counts II through VII of the Amended Complaint. (R. 476-78.) 
On January 25, 2007, the Parr Law Firm filed a motion for summary judgment on 
Count I of the Amended Complaint. (R. 429.) On August 20, 2007, the district court 
issued a Memorandum Decision denying the motion, and on September 17, 2007, it 
entered its order denying summary judgment. (R. 495, 501.) On appeal, this Court 
reversed the denial of summary judgment in Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, 197 P.3d 659. No appeal was taken from that decision and 
10511407 4 
the dismissal of Count I is not the subject of this appeal. The district court entered a final 
judgment on all claims on February 18,2009. (R. 676-78.) 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 9, 2002, Iomed, Inc. ("Iomed") filed a complaint in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 020903031 (the "Iomed Case"), against its former 
employee, Jamal Yanaki, and others. (R. 130.) Iomed alleged that Mr. Yanaki had 
misappropriated proprietary information about an invention and that Mr. Yanaki was 
poised to open a competing business. (R. 41-72.) Iomed was represented by the Pan-
Law Firm in that case, and the case was assigned to Judge Tyrone E. Medley. (R. 130.) 
At the outset of the Iomed Case, the Parr Law Firm obtained two ex parte 
discovery orders from Judge Medley that authorized the seizure of certain electronically 
stored data and other records maintained at the home office of Mr. Yanaki and Ms. Moss, 
in order to preserve critical evidence. (R. 106-09, 111-12, 130-31.) These orders are 
referred to collectively herein as the "Discovery Order." The Discovery Order was 
issued pursuant to lomed's motion, memorandum and affidavits, all of which showed that 
Mr. Yanaki had removed trade secrets from Iomed, that he intended to compete with 
Iomed using this information, and that there was a risk of destruction because the 
evidence was stored on Mr. Yanaki's computer. (R. 130-31; 187-218). According to the 
Amended Complaint, the Discovery Order had the ostensible legal purpose to protect 
trade secrets and conduct discovery, but was really intended to send a "message" to 
lomed's employees that they should sign non-compete agreements. (R. 131.) 
The Discovery Order directed the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, or other 
appropriate law officials, with the assistance of Iomed, to take custody of certain 
electronic files maintained at the residence of plaintiffs. The Discovery Order authorized 
Iomed to copy the files and return the copies to Mr. Yanaki and to file the originals with 
the court under seal. Finally, the Discovery Order allowed counsel for Mr. Yanaki to 
10511407.4 
review the electronic files and make objections before they would be made available to 
Iomed's counsel and experts. (R. 106-09, 111-12.) 
According to the Amended Complaint, on the morning of April 15, 2002, 
defendant Matkin and a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff rang the doorbell of the 
plaintiffs' home. Mr. Yanaki was out of town at the time, but Ms. Moss answered the 
door. (R. 133.) The officer handed Ms. Moss a summons, a complaint, and a copy of the 
Discovery Order authorizing the seizure of documents relating to Iomed's claim of 
misappropriation. (R. 133.) Ms. Moss declined to allow Mr. Matkin and the officer in 
the home in Mr. Yanaki's absence. (R. 134.) Mr. Matkin told Ms. Moss he intended to 
obtain a further court order and left. (R. 134.) Mr. Matkin obtained a second order from 
Judge Medley denominated "Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement," which 
authorized use of reasonable force to enter the house and seize the relevant records. (R. 
134-35.) Mr. Matkin then returned with the Supplemental Order, and Ms. Moss allowed 
Mr. Matkin, the officer, and others into the home to execute the Discovery Order. 
Subsequently, Mr. Yanaki's computer hard drive and additional documents were 
deposited with the Court, in accordance with the Discovery Order. (R. 136-37.) 
While the Iomed Case was pending, Mr. Yanaki and Ms. Moss filed a lawsuit 
against the Parr Law Firm and others in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah alleging civil rights violations arising from the seizure of evidence pursuant to the 
district court's Discovery Order. (R. 137-38.) That case, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Federal Civil Rights Case," was eventually dismissed because the federal court did not 
find a Section 1983 violation and declined to hear the state law claims. (Id.; See Yanaki v. 
Iomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Utah 2004), afFd 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), 
cert, denied, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006).) 
Plaintiffs served their Complaint in the present lawsuit in December 2005, about 
20 months after the dismissal of the Federal Civil Rights Case, and about four months after 
the complete settlement of the Iomed case. (R. 128.) In Counts II through VII of the 
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Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs pled the following tort claims arising out of the Pan-
Law Firm's obtaining and implementing the Discovery Order: abuse of process, invasion 
of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land and chattel, 
conversion, and civil conspiracy (collectively referred to herein as plaintiffs' "tort 
claims"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The bone of contention in this case is whether plaintiffs can sue a law firm for 
representing a client and acting in accordance with court orders in another civil case, 
which has now been settled. Reduced to its essentials, the allegedly tortious act described 
in the Amended Complaint is this: on behalf of their client, the Parr Law Firm obtained 
and implemented the Discovery Order issued by the district court to prevent plaintiffs' 
destruction of crucial evidence. The district court correctly held that the Parr Law Firm's 
conduct in obtaining and implementing the Discovery Order was privileged under the 
judicial proceedings and First Amendment privileges. These privileges protect the 
statements and conduct of lawyers, litigants, witnesses, judges, and jurors in the litigation 
process. These privileges are absolute and insulate attorneys for actions specifically 
authorized by the courts before which they appear. 
Plaintiffs' tort claims also fail for the independent reason that the Discovery Order 
was lawful; the district court was not obligated to assume the Discovery Order was 
unlawful simply because the Amended Complaint later stated it was unlawful. Beyond 
that, the plaintiffs are estopped from now arguing that the Discovery Order was unlawful 
because they did not dispute the entry of the order at the time, nor did they take an appeal 
from its entry. The district court correctly held that the Discovery Order was not 
unlawful, but instead was reasonable and necessary to preserve evidence. 
Finally, each of plaintiffs' tort claims fail as a matter of law because the plaintiffs 
failed to allege facts sufficient to support their claims. For all of these reasons, the 
district court properly dismissed Counts II through IV of the First Amended CDmplaint. 
10511407 4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE BARS THE PLAINTIFFS' 
TORT CLAIMS. 
The lower court correctly held that the judicial proceedings privilege bars all of 
the plaintiffs' tort claims in this case. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
privilege protects communications "(1) made during or in the course of a judicial 
proceeding; (2) hav[ing] some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3). 
. . made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel." 
Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, f 13, 40 P.3d 1128 (quoting DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 
1111,992 P.2d 979).3 Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred in this action because they all stem 
from the Discovery Order obtained in the "course of a judicial proceeding;" the 
Discovery Order unquestionably makes "reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding;5' and the Discovery Order was obtained by counsel in the action. The 
circumstances under which the Discovery Order arose and was executed meet the 
requirements for the application of the privilege.4 
Despite their recognition that the privilege is absolute and that it is meant to 
provide protection to institutional actors in the course of litigation, plaintiffs make two 
primary arguments against the lower court's application of the judicial privilege in this 
case. First, plaintiffs claim the privilege should not have been applied at the pleadings 
stage of the case. Second, plaintiffs claim that the privilege only extends to 
"communications-based" claims, and that it does not apply to "actions" taken by 
attorneys. For the following reasons, these arguments are contrary to the law. 
If the privilege applies, it protects participants at "every step in the proceeding until 
final disposition," including during the discovery phase of a case. DeBry, 1999 UT 111, 
% 14 (internal citations omitted). 
4
 In their opening brief, plaintiffs state that they "have no quarrel with the general 
propositions that a privilege exists to make defamatory statements in litigation, that the 
privilege is absolute, that it protects witnesses, lawyers, parties and judges from liability 
for making defamatory statements or that the privilege lasts throughout the entire 
litigation . . .." (Opening Brief, at n.8.) 
A. The Judicial Proceedings Privilege Is Absolute and Is Appropriately 
Applied at the Pleading Stage of the Litigation. 
The judicial proceedings privilege is "absolute," Beezley v. Hansen, 286 P.2d 
1057, 1058 (Utah 1955), meaning that it is "'justified and defined by the functions it 
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches."' Rolon v. Henneman, 517 
F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)). 
While plaintiffs do not dispute that it is an absolute privilege, they claim that the judge 
erred in applying the judicial proceedings privilege at the pleading stage of this 
litigation.5 In other words, plaintiffs argue that they should have been allowed to proceed 
through discovery before the privilege could be applied. Plaintiffs, however, did not 
argue below and do not now give any explanation as to what discovery would change the 
application of the privilege in this case. 
Courts recognize that immunity from suit provides protection from the rigors of 
discovery, not just from liability. Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558, 563 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that qualified immunity for public officials extends to protections from 
"unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings" (citing Crawford-El v. 
Britten, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998)). "[T]rial courts should rule as early as possible on 
5
 Plaintiffs cite Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Center, Inc., 2005 UT App 325, 122 
P.3d 891, for the proposition that the court erred in ruling on the pleadings based on an 
affirmative defense. (Opening Brief, at 19-20.) Zoumadakis is distinguishable. In 
Zoumadakis, the Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a defamation claim based on the affirmative defense of a 
qualified immunity privilege. 2005 UT App 325, f 7. In a defamation case, the plaintiff 
initially has the burden of setting forth "'the language complained of. . . in words or 
words to that effect.'" Id If 3 (citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 970 
(Utah 1982)). If the defendant alleges a qualified privilege as an affirmative defense, the 
burden shifts "to the plaintiff to show the inapplicability of a qualified privilege." Id. % 6. 
Given the burden shifting unique to defamation cases, the plaintiff is not required to 
anticipate the affirmative defense of a qualified privilege in its initial complaint to 
survive a motion to dismiss. Id As Zoumadakis evinces, both a claim of defamation and 
an affirmative defense of a qualified privilege are fact intensive. In contrast, because the 
affirmative defenses here are absolute and not contingent on proving particular facts, they 
are an appropriate basis for a judgment on the pleadings. 
mswdcn A 
the existence of an absolute privilege," because c"[t]he essence of an immunity from suit 
is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.5" Marsh v. 
Hollander, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Finkelstein, Thompson & 
Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 340 (D.C. 2001)). If the 
judicial proceedings privilege attached only after extensive discovery on the application 
of the privilege, its policy purpose would be compromised. Speech would still be chilled 
— in contravention of the clear policy purpose of the judicial proceedings privilege — if 
the privilege only attached after extensive discovery. "'These absolute privileges are 
based chiefly upon a recognition of the necessity that certain persons, because of their 
special position or status, should be as free as possible from fear that their actions in that 
position might have an adverse effect upon their own personal interests. To accomplish 
this, it is necessary for them to be protected not only from civil liability but also from the 
danger of even an unsuccessful civil action.'" Finkelstein, 774 A.2d at 340 n. 8 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 25, Title B, at 243)). 
In fact, courts routinely dismiss claims, such as those brought by plaintiffs, on the 
pleadings based on the absolute immunity of the judicial proceedings privilege. See 
Riddle, 2002 UT 10, ^ ftj 1, 7 (affirming the lower court's dismissal of a defamation case 
on the pleadings because the legislative proceedings privilege, like the judicial 
proceedings privilege, is absolute); Rolon, 517 F.3d at 142, 146-47 (affirming a judgment 
on the pleadings in favor of the defendants based on the absolute immunity of the judicial 
proceedings privilege); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, 175 
F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming the lower court's dismissal of defamation and 
legal malpractice claims because the claims were barred by the absolute judicial 
proceedings privilege); Lambdin Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791,791-92 
(Tenn. 1978) (affirming the lower court's dismissal for failure to state a claim because 
the judicial proceedings privilege is absolute); Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant 
Program, 539 A.2d 1372, 1373-75 (Pa. Super. Ct 1988) (upholding dismissal of claims 
against hospital attorney based on judicial proceedings privilege). Accordingly, the 
district court appropriately applied the judicial proceedings privilege at the pleading stage 
of the litigation. 
B. The Judicial Proceedings Privilege Applies to AH of Plaintiffs' Tort 
Claims. 
Plaintiffs concede that the judicial proceedings privilege covers the Parr Law 
Firm's filings with the court and its arguments in front of the court on the Discovery 
Order, but they contend that the privilege does not extend to the actual execution of the 
Discovery Order. (See Opening Brief, at n.8.) In other words, they argue that the 
privilege only applies to "communication-based claims." (Id. at 35.) Plaintiffs' position, 
however, is contrary to clear case law and the policy implications that support the law. 
The court cannot divorce the protections afforded the statements that supported the 
Discovery Order from the execution of the order; black letter law articulating the judicial 
proceedings privilege rejects such a narrow construction. 
/. The judicial proceedings privilege extends to any tort arising out of 
an attorneys' participation in a judicial proceeding. 
Despite plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, the judicial proceedings privilege 
extends to court-sanctioned actions throughout the course of the proceeding, DeBry, 1999 
UT 111, Tf 14, and bars "all claims arising from the same statements" made during 
judicial proceedings. Id f 25 (internal citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the judicial privilege is designed "to ensure free and open expression by all 
participants injudicial proceedings by alleviating any and all fear that participation will 
subject them to the risk of subsequent legal actions." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 
1258 (Utah 1997). Under this broad mandate, absolute privileges "extend . . . to persons 
whose special position or status required that they be as free as possible from fear that 
their actions in their position might subject them to legal action." O'Connor v. 
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Burningham, 2007 UT 58, % 29, 165 P.3d 1214 (internal citations omitted).6 If a question 
arises about whether the facts of a case fall within the judicial proceedings privilege, the 
question should be resolved in favor of the application of the privilege. See Pratt v. 
Nelson, 2007 UT 41,1f 30, 164 P.3d 366 (a[I]f doubt as to [the] relevancy" of the 
statement under the second prong "exists, it should be resolved in favor of the statement 
having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding." (internal citations omitted)). 
Because the judicial proceedings privilege is absolute, it applies to all tort claims 
based on the defendant's participation in a judicial proceeding, not just communication-
based claims such as defamation. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1258 (Utah 1997) (barring a 
claim for intentional interference with business relations under the judicial proceedings 
privilege); see also DeBry, 1999 UT 111, f 25 (holding that the judicial proceedings 
privilege barred a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Without such 
sweeping protection against "all claims arising from the same allegedly defamatory 
statements," the threat of litigation threatens to inhibit "[p]articipation in a judicial 
proceeding." Price, 949 P.2d 1251 at 1258; see also DeBry, 1999 UT 111, f 25 ("the 
judicial proceeding privilege extends not only to defamation claims but to all claims 
arising from the same statements" (internal citations omitted)). 
6
 The absolute immunity afforded under the judicial proceedings privilege even extends 
to false statements. The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[i]t is not 
inimical to" the objective of integrity within a judicial proceeding "that speakers may 
express false statements, even those uttered with ill motives, within judicial proceedings 
free of the risk that tort will hold them to account. The system achieves a satisfactory 
measure of confidence that the search for truth has been fruitful when all who claim to 
possess part of or the entire truth may freely disclose the basis of that claim." O'Connor, 
2007 UT 58,130. 
7
 Although here plaintiffs appear to be primarily contesting the application of the judicial 
proceedings privilege to their abuse of process claim, the rationale behind the privilege 
extends to all of the torts they brought against defendants. For instance, allowing a tort 
claim for conspiracy to proceed against an attorney based on conversations with her 
client would detrimentally interfere with the attorney's ability "to freely speak with her 
client" and function in her capacity as an officer of the court. P.J., ex rel. Jensen v. Utah, 
2008 WL 4372933, *12 (D. Utah, Sept. 22, 2008). 
i n c i i AI\I A 
Of particular concern to the appellant appears to be the application of the judicial 
proceedings privilege to an abuse of process claim. Courts, however, have routinely held 
that the privilege applies to abuse of process claims. For example, in Rusheen v. Cohen, 
128 P.3d 713 (Cal. 2006), the California Supreme Court considered whether the litigation 
privilege should bar an abuse of process claim. Id. at 715. Similar to Utah law, under 
California law, an abuse of process claim requires a showing that the defendant "(1) 
contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a willful act in 
the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings." Id. at 718. 
California codified its common law litigation privilege, but otherwise its elements are 
similar to Utah's judicial proceedings privilege. Id. at 718. The application of the 
privilege requires a showing that the communication was "(1) made injudicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to 
achieve the objections of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical 
relation to the action." Id. In balancing an abuse of process tort against the litigation 
privilege, the court determined that "where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged 
communication . . . the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative 
acts . . . " and thus bars an abuse of process claim. Id. at 722. 
The Rusheen court held that barring abuse of process torts when the physical 
action arises directly from a privileged communication is necessary to ensure "litigants 
and witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by 
derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of communication and zealous 
advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments, and 
to avoid unending litigation." Id. at 722.8 Notably, the court held that applying abuse of 
process liability to actions arising out of judicial proceedings would threaten "the goal of 
finality of judgments" by creating another round of litigation on underlying actions that 
o 
The court acknowledged that the expansion of the litigation privilege could necessarily 
limit the abuse of process tort but held that the policy preference of unfettered access to 
the courts predominated. Id at 722. 
had already been decided. Id at 723. The court also held that because the physical 
actions at issue - the enforcement of a judgment - arose directly out of a judicial 
proceeding, the plaintiffs had other means of redress. Id. at 723-24; see also Hatch v. 
Davis, 2006 UT 44, <|[ 40, 147 P.3d 383 (noting that an abuse of process claim can only 
proceed if the plaintiffs have no opportunity for redress "within the litigation forum 
itself5). 
Other courts have followed similar reasoning and applied the judicial proceedings 
privilege to abuse of process claims. For example, in Field v. Kearns, 682 A.2d 148 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996), the Appellate Court of Connecticut extended absolute immunity 
barring an abuse of process claim arising out of the defendant's filing of a bar grievance 
claim against another lawyer. Id. at 149. The court recognized that the potential harm 
caused "to an attorney's reputation and career from groundless complaints is great" but 
established absolute immunity for the filing of bar grievances anyway because of the 
concern that the specter of "retaliatory lawsuits . . . would have a chilling effect" and 
"reduce the bar's effectiveness in policing its own ranks." Id. at 153 (internal citations 
omitted). Similarly, in Netterville v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Miss. 
1981), the court extended absolute immunity to an attorney who purportedly abused the 
judicial process by filing a bar complaint against another attorney to gain an advantage in 
a products liability suit. The court held that under Mississippi common law, absolute 
immunity applies in the face of abuse of process claims "so long as the statements made 
or documents filed are reasonably related to the judicial inquiry." Id. at 1112. 
In addition to abuse of process claims, other jurisdictions similarly apply the 
judicial proceedings privilege to bar a wide range of tort claims. See, e.g., Lambdin 
Funeral Serv., Inc., 559 S.W.2d at 792 (invasion of privacy); Middlesex Concrete Prods, 
and Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 172 A.2d 22, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1961) (tortious interference); Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370-73 (Cal. 1990) 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Thornton v. Rhoden, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 716-
19 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (abuse of process based on discovery allegedly conducted 
for improper purposes); Hugeh 175 F.3d at 17-18 (legal malpractice). 
The same policies behind a liberal application of the privilege articulated by Utah 
courts have been articulated by other jurisdictions as well. The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, for instance, held that "all doubts are to be resolved in favor of pertinency and 
application of the privilege." Hugel, 175 F.3d at 16. In Silberg, the California Supreme 
Court stated that "[t]he principal purpose of. . . [the judicial proceedings privilege] is to 
afford litigants and witnesses . . . the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear 
of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.... [The privilege] further 
promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to zealously 
protect their clients' interests." 786 P.2d at 369-370. 
2. The judicial proceedings privilege protects conduct as well as 
communications. 
The judicial proceedings privilege extends not only to communications, but also to 
physical actions taken as a result of statements made injudicial proceedings. In Clodgo 
by Clodgo v. Bowman, 601 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), for instance, the court held 
that the judicial proceedings privilege barred a medical malpractice action against a 
physician for incorrectly conducting paternity testing and certifying the incorrect testing 
to the court in the form of a medical opinion letter. Id at 343-44. The plaintiff attempted 
to reinstate the paternity suit after the error was discovered, but the suit was dismissed on 
res judicata grounds and the appeal was denied. Id. at 344. 
The Clodgo court considered the same question at issue here: '"whether the 
absolute testimonial privilege for communications made in connection with judicial 
proceedings" extends to conduct in addition to communications. IdL at 344. The court 
held that "[rjegardless of the tort contained in the complaint, if the communication was 
made in connection with a judicial proceeding and was material and relevant to it, the 
privilege applies." Id at 345. The defendant's physical act of running the paternity test 
did not alter the application of the privilege to a medical malpractice claim. Id. Despite 
the compelling facts of the plaintiffs case, policy considerations were determinative. Id. 
The court held that liability "simply cannot be allowed as the privilege is necessary to 
prevent witnesses from refusing to testify based on a fear of potential civil liability." Id. 
at 345. 
Likewise, in Rusheen, the California Supreme Court held that actions taken to 
execute a judgment, including a "levy on the judgment debtor's property," were immune 
from a claim for abuse of process where the attorney had allegedly obtained the default 
judgment by filing a false declaration of service. 128 P.3d at 715. The court reasoned 
that the gravamen of the complaint was the filing of the false affidavit, and that a levy on 
the assets was an outgrowth of that privileged communication. Id. at 722.9 
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint here is that the defendants improperly 
executed what plaintiffs characterize as an illegal search warrant. The filing of the 
discovery motion by the Parr Law Firm was a privileged communicative act from which 
the execution of the Discovery Order directly flowed. Indeed, only one of the three 
individual defendants participated in the execution of the Discovery Order at all. As the 
Rusheen court reasoned, "[S]ince a party may not be liable for submitting false . . . 
evidence in the course of judicial proceedings which are used to obtain a judgment, the 
9
 Despite plaintiffs' contention otherwise, Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant 
Program, 539 A.2d 1372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), is also on point. In Brown, the plaintiffs 
made precisely the same argument that plaintiffs make here and it was rejected by the 
court. In Brown, the attorney for a hospital was sued for obtaining a court order to allow 
the hospital to extract organs from a brain-dead man for transplantation. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the lawyer obtained the order unlawfully without notifying the next-of-kin 
and sued for mutilation of the corpse and assault and battery. The appellate court 
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the attorney was protected from tort liability by the 
judicial proceedings privilege and in doing so rejected the plaintiffs argument that the 
privilege did not extend to "intentionally tortuous behavior." Id, at 1374-75. The court 
reasoned that the privilege protects attorneys from liability for actions that stem from 
"pertinent communication[s] . . . undertaken in connection with representation of a client 
in a judicial proceeding." Id at 1375. 
party should likewise be immune from abuse of process claims for subsequent acts 
necessary to enforce it. Otherwise, application of the litigation privilege would be 
thwarted." 128 P.3d at 722. 
The judicial proceedings privilege specifically precludes claims like those 
presented by plaintiffs here based on allegations that attorneys conducted improper 
discovery with police assistance and obtained unlawful court orders. In Forro Precision, 
Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), for 
instance, Forro alleged that IBM, accompanied by police, conducted an unlawful search 
of the plaintiffs business premises in search of evidence that the plaintiff had 
misappropriated trade secrets. Id. at 1051. Forro asserted claims for antitrust violations 
and intentional interference with business relationships based on allegations that IBM 
was "a puppeteer directing the actions of the police," in order to "subject the company to 
a 'thunderclap5 of adverse publicity." IdL at 1051, 1053. The Ninth Circuit held that 
IBM's "communications to the authorities and participation in the search were 
privileged" under the judicial proceedings privilege. IdL at 1051-52 (emphasis added). 
Notably, the court rejected Forro's claim that the judicial proceedings privilege did not 
apply because IBM was acting entirely with an ulterior motive. Id at 1056 ("The 
absolute privilege is not defeated . . . by the communicant's ulterior motives").10 
3. The policy of the law supports the application of the judicial 
proceedings privilege in this case. 
The law set forth above and the supporting policy considerations support the 
application of the privilege to the Parr Law Firm's statements as well as to the actions 
they took to implement the Discovery Order according to its terms. Application of the 
judicial proceedings privilege in the present case would be thwarted if it did not extend to 
10
 Plaintiffs argue that Forro does not support the defendants' position because in Forro, 
the "request for the search warrant was valid and the request from the police for 
assistance was reasonable" and consequently the judicial proceedings privilege was 
appropriately applied. (Opening Brief, at 33.) We address plaintiffs' contention that the 
underlying Discovery Order in this case was illegal below. (See infra pp. 21-31.) 
the actions authorized by the district court's Discovery Order. That is why "modem 
public policy seeks to encourage free access to the courts and finality of judgments by 
limiting derivative tort claims arising out of litigation-related misconduct and by favoring 
sanctions within the original lawsuit." Rusheen, 128 P.3d at 723 (emphasis added); see 
also Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 
639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) ("In balancing policy considerations, we find that 
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course of a judicial 
proceeding" and that "[t]he rational behind the immunity afforded to defamatory 
statements is equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a 
judicial proceeding."). 
Defendants Waddoups and Hafen did nothing more than prepare moving papers to 
present to the district court and defendant Matkin did only what the district court 
specifically authorized in the Discovery Order. Utah has long recognized an absolute 
privilege for written and oral statements by attorneys in the conduct of litigation. A 
necessary corollary is that attorneys must likewise be free to take action that is 
specifically authorized by the courts before which they appear. This is particularly true 
in the discovery context, where attorneys must frequently take some physical actions to 
comply with the court's orders (i.e., examine documents at the opposing party's offices, 
review personal and potentially embarrassing email, or even arrange for service of 
process). 
If attorneys were subject to liability in subsequent litigation for taking judicially 
authorized action, they would be inhibited from zealously representing their clients, 
thereby frustrating one of the fundamental purposes of the privilege. It would defeat the 
purpose of the privilege for the defendants to enjoy an absolute privilege for filing the 
discovery motion with the district court (which they unquestionably do), but to be denied 
protection in carrying out the resulting order. Such a ruling would undermine the 
effective operation of the judicial system. See, DeBry, 992 P.2d at 984-85 ("The interest 
of justice as well as the integrity of the judicial process is ill-served if an officer of the 
court experiences intimidation . . . because of her role in a judicial proceeding." (internal 
citations omitted)); Beezley, 286 P.2d at 1058 (The judicial proceedings privilege "is 
based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost 
freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients." (internal citations omitted)). 
n. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO PETITION ALSO BAR PLAINTIFFS' TORT CLAIMS. 
The First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances" provides an independent bar to plaintiffs' tort claims. The constitutional 
right to petition "bars any claim, federal or state, common law or statutory, that has as its 
gravamen constitutionally-protected petitioning activity." Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco 
Corp., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 948, 956 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (emphasis added). Although case law 
about the right to petition was developed primarily in the antitrust arena, "the 
constitutional protection of the right to petition is no less compelling in the context of 
common-law tort claims," like abuse of process actions. See Cove Rd. Dev. v. W. 
Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674 A.2d 1234, 1237 (R.I. 1996) (indicating that the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine can bar claims for abuse of process); see also Anderson Dev. 
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, If 26, 116 P.3d 323 (describing the application of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to bar tort claims that interfere with the right to petition). 
Like the judicial proceedings privilege, this prohibition arises out of a policy 
concern that "tort liability for abuse of process . . . would infringe or chill [the 
defendant's] First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress of grievances." 
Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 914 (10th Cir. 2000); Gen-Probe, Inc., 926 F.Supp. at 955 
(recognizing that the "Ninth Circuit set up a heightened pleading standard for claims 
based upon petitioning activity because of the risk that frivolous claims could have a 
chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights."). 
The privilege applies even when the petitioning party is motivated by an improper 
purpose. In articulating the right to petition, the Supreme Court stated that 4"[t]he right 
of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect to 
the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent 
in doing so.'" Prof 1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49, 58 (1993) (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)); kL at 57 (holding that immunity under the right to petition 
still applies even when the petitioner's "sole purpose . . . was to destroy [their] 
competitors" (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138)). 
This Court should assume that the constitutional protections of the First 
Amendment apply unless the actual petition constitutes a "sham." Prof 1 Real Estate 
Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 56; see also Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, ^ 27 ("[U]nder 
the sham exception, an individual will be liable if he uses the governmental process-as 
opposed to the outcome of that process-as a weapon" (internal citations omitted)). A 
court proceeding only constitutes a "sham" if first it is "objectively baseless in the sense 
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." Prof 1 Real 
Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60. Only if the suit is "objectively meritless" should 
the court next consider whether it is driven by subjective bad faith. Id. at 60. The 
implication of the Supreme Court's two-pronged test is that "a finding that the lawsuit is 
not objectively baseless precludes liability regardless of improper motive." Gen-Probe, 
Inc., 926 F. Supp. at 957. 
On the face of the pleadings, plaintiffs cannot establish that the Parr Law Firm's 
filings in support of the Discovery Order were a "sham" under the Supreme Court's 
articulation of the test. The very fact that the district court granted the Discovery Order 
prepared by the Parr Law Firm indicates that the order had sufficient substance to avoid 
being categorized as "objectively baseless" under the first prong of the analysis. See 
Cove Rd. Dev., 674 A.2d at 1239 (holding that the court's refusal to dismiss the 
defendant's claim was sufficient evidence to prove that the underlying action was not 
"objectively baseless"). Even assuming the ulterior motive plaintiffs attribute to Iomed, 
plaintiffs have not alleged, and could not plausibly allege, that there was no cognizable 
basis for Iomed's trade secrets claim or that the Discovery Order at issue was not 
reasonably designed to preserve the evidence needed to adjudicate that claim. 
Because plaintiffs cannot allege that Iomed's trade secrets misappropriation action 
against Mr. Yanaki was a "sham," the First Amendment protects the Parr Law Firm from 
tort liability for actions that have as their "gravamen constitutionally-protected 
petitioning activity." Gen-Probe, Inc., 926 F. Supp. at 956 (emphasis added). Without 
question, the court-ordered search of Mr. Yanaki's home arose directly from 
constitutionally-protected petitioning activity: namely, the defendants' filings for 
discovery on behalf of their client, Iomed. It follows that the First Amendment right to 
petition constitutes an independent bar to plaintiffs' tort claims. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING TORT CLAIMS ALL FAIL AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BECAUSE THE DISCOVERY ORDER WAS NOT UNLAWFUL. 
Even if the judicial proceeding and First Amendment privileges do not apply, each 
of plaintiffs' tort claims would still fail as a matter of law. The crux of each of plaintiffs' 
tort claims is that the Discovery Order of the district court was an "illegal search and 
seizure." In the Amended Complaint, as well as in their opening brief, plaintiffs do not 
make a fact-based challenge to the district court's decision to issue the Discovery Order 
(i.e., was there sufficient evidence to issue the order), but instead argue that the 
Discovery Order is per se illegal. (R. 132-33.) Plaintiffs further contend that the court 
must assume the illegality of the search under the procedural posture required of Rule 
12(c). Both of these arguments are contrary to the law for the following reasons. 
A. The Lower Court Did Not Have to Assume that the Discovery Order 
Authorized an "Illegal" Search Under the Procedural Posture 
Required of a 12(c) Motion. 
Throughout its opening brief, the appellant insists that the underlying search of 
Mr. Yanaki's home was "illegal" and that the lower court improperly failed to assume 
this "fact" when it ruled on the defendants' 12(c) motion.11 When considering a Rule 
12(c) motion, however, the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint, but 
"[l]egal conclusions, deductions, and opinions couched as facts are . . . not presumed to 
be true." Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999); see also Cayman 
Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir. 1989) 
("well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as 
true"); 5C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1368 ("Although the moving party, for 
purposes of the Rule 12(c) motion, concedes the accuracy of the factual allegations in his 
adversary's pleading, he does not admit other assertions in the opposing party's pleading 
that constitute conclusions of law, legally impossible facts, or matters that would not be 
admissible in evidence at trial."). 
Instead of making an improper factual determination, the district court simply 
rejected the legal premise of the plaintiffs' argument that the Discovery Order was per se 
illegal. The lower court stated, "[t]he Petitioners claim this was a search and seizure 
under the criminal law and not a valid discovery order under the civil law. If Plaintiff s 
position is accepted, then there could be no real discovery in a civil action of this nature." 
(R. 466.) The plaintiffs' assertion that the underlying search was illegal is not a fact, but 
instead a legal characterization. To prevail on a judgment on the pleadings, the moving 
party does not have to assume that incorrect legal conclusions are facts. Jensen, 45 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1270. The plaintiffs did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that led 
to the issuance of the Discovery Order, nor do they allege that the Parr Law Firm 
exceeded the scope of the order. Instead, plaintiffs make a blanket argument that a 
11
 For instance, the plaintiffs state that "[a]t the time [the defendants] caused such Search 
Motion to be filed, defendants knew that the relief they sought was illegal under both the 
Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States." (Opening Brief, at 6.) The 
plaintiffs claim that the Writ of Assistance "constituted a legal process that, under both 
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States of America, could not be 
lawfully used to conduct a search and seizure. (Opening Brief, at 9.) Additional 
references to the illegality of the purported seizure pepper the plaintiffs' brief. (See, e.g., 
id at 21.) 
discovery order cannot allow for the entry of a home for the seizure of evidence. The 
district court properly made a legal determination that such a discovery order is not 
unlawful. No amount of discovery would change the legal arguments about whether the 
Discovery Order on its face was valid. 
B. Collateral Estoppel Precludes the Plaintiffs from Now Arguing that the 
Discovery Order Was "Illegal." 
The plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from arguing that the discovery order was 
illegal because they did not challenge it in the underlying lomed trade secrets case. In 
granting the defendant's 12(c) motion, the lower court stated: "The Plaintiff, Yanaki, 
should have objected to the supposed illegality of the discovery order in the initial lomed 
case wherein he was sued. He never pressed an objection to that order. He settled the 
case so there was no appeal. It is, therefore, presumed that the discovery order was valid 
. . . . [Yanaki] had an obligation to challenge the order if he felt it was illegal or even 
improperly issued, especially since lomed5s case depended on it. The Plaintiffs are 
collaterally estopped from pursuing this claim." (R. 467.) Without the support of any 
authority, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred in its collateral estoppel ruling because 
Mr. Yanaki had no way of challenging the underlying ex parte discovery order. (Opening 
Brief, at 21.) The plaintiffs also argue that the elements of collateral estoppel are 
factually based and cannot be applied in the context of a ruling on the pleadings. (Id.) 
The plaintiffs' arguments are incorrect. 
There is no question that Mr. Yanaki could have objected to the Discovery Order 
in the lomed trade secrets case, moved to have it quashed, sought to have any evidence 
obtained through the order excluded, or moved for Rule 11 sanctions against lomed and 
its counsel. In fact, the Discovery Order provided Mr. Yanaki's counsel with a means to 
object to its terms. Paragraph 4 of the Discovery Order stated: "Yanaki or his counsel 
shall be allowed to review the Yanaki Electronic Files and the lomed files upon 
reasonable notice to the Court and lomed for the purpose of determining if Yanaki has 
objections that such files contained privileged, confidential or other information that 
would not be discoverable in this action." (R. 108 (emphasis added).) The Discovery 
Order further provided that such a review be completed within twenty days of the lower 
court obtaining the ordered discovery. (Id.) Mr. Yanaki took no action to challenge the 
order or to object to the introduction of the evidence. 
Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge the Discovery Order at the appropriate 
time and in front of the appropriate court, they are now legally barred from alleging that 
the Discovery Order was improper. In Buzzanco v. Lord Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 376 
(W.D. Penn. 2001), plaintiffs sued the Lord Corporation, its law firm, and the sheriff for 
executing an ex parte writ of seizure in a trade secrets case filed by the Lord Corporation 
in state court. Id at 378-79. In the federal lawsuit, plaintiffs claimed that "the search and 
seizure was improper because it was conducted without advance notice and went beyond 
the scope of both in the places that were searched and the items that were seized." Id. at 
384. The court, however, rejected plaintiffs' claims, among other reasons, on the grounds 
that they were "collaterally estopped from pursuing this theory." Id. Specifically, the 
court recognized that one of the plaintiffs had brought a motion in the underlying case 
post-seizure regarding the seizure order and the judge had "confirmed the issuance of the 
writ." Id. The court held that even the family members who were not parties to the 
underlying state action were bound by the court's decision because they were in privity 
with the parties who challenged the order. Id at 385. Finally, the court also found that 
the seizure order was reasonable. See id. at 385-86. 
Similarly, the plaintiffs' tort claims in this action are premised on the purported 
illegality of the underlying Discovery Order, but this argument is improper, given Mr. 
Yanaki's failure to challenge the Discovery Order in the underlying action. In this case, 
the lower court appropriately assumed the legality of the Discovery Order, given the 
general principle that "one district court judge cannot overrule another district court judge 
of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987) See State v. 
Morgan, 527 P.2d 225, 226 (Utah 1974) ("Generally one District Judge cannot overrule 
another acting District Judge having identical authority and stature."). Contrary to the 
plaintiffs' characterization, the district court was making a legal determination regarding 
collateral estoppel. See Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1974) (holding 
that in the absence of justifying circumstances, it is inappropriate for "one district judge 
to vacate the orders of his colleagues"). This type of legal analysis is wholly appropriate 
on the pleadings because it constitutes a legal determination. Buzzanco, 173 F.Supp.2d 
at 378, 385 (holding, on the pleadings, that an issue was barred by collateral estoppel). 
C. The Discovery Was Lawful. 
Even if the plaintiffs had challenged the underlying Discovery Order in the 
appropriate forum, there was nothing wrong with the discovery sought or obtained by 
Iomed in the underlying case. Circumstances arise during the course of discovery in 
which courts allow the seizure of evidence from an individual's home in the interest of 
preserving that evidence. In fact, according to one commentator, in the civil context, 
"[t]here must be literally thousands of actions in which ex parte seizures have been 
authorized and have been executed without a hitch." Jules D. Zaion, Ex Parte Seizure 
Orders: Don't Kill the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 
181, 191 (1999). Seizure orders are particularly necessary to preserve electronic 
evidence because, by its nature, such electronic evidence can be readily altered, 
transferred or eliminated. To obtain and preserve the crucial electronic evidence, the 
Parr Law Firm appropriately moved for entry of the Discovery Order to place the 
computer drives in the custody of the Court before Mr. Yanaki could have an opportunity 
"Computer-based records may be deleted quickly and easily . . . . This characteristic of 
electronic evidence offers opportunities for surreptitious concealment or destruction and 
often serves as the basis for requesting an ex parte order seizing computer-based records 
. . . As a threshold matter, evidence that a party is 'likely to take the opportunity' to 
conceal or destroy evidence must be shown. For example, a showing that a party has a 
history of concealing evidence may provide persuasive grounds for issuing an ex parte 
seizure order." James Wm. Moore, et al, Moore's Federal Practice § 37A.21[7] (3d ed. 
1997). In the Iomed case, it is undisputed that Mr. Yanaki destroyed e-mails prior to the 
issuance of the Discovery Order. 
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to destroy or hide them. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Canstar (U.S.A.) Inc., 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38414, *2-4 (N.D. 111. Aug. 24, 2005) ("Ex parte orders of very limited 
scope and brief duration may be justified in order to preserve evidence where the 
applicant shows that notice would result in destruction of evidence." (citation omitted)). 
A wide variety of statutes, cases, and procedural rules allow for the kind of discovery to 
protect property that Iomed obtained in the underlying action. 
The discovery procedure authorized by Utah's Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
supports the validity of the discovery sought by Iomed in the underlying action. Section 
13-24-3(3) of the Act states that, "[i]n appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to 
protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order." Utah Code Ann. §13-24-3(3). 
Section 13-24-6 of the Act provides that "a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged 
trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in 
connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records 
of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged 
trade secret without prior court approval." Id. §13-24-6. Interpreting these provisions, in 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the trial court granted 
the plaintiffs motions for ex parte writs of replevin and assistance to recover trade 
secrets that had been misappropriated by the defendants. Id at 490. Under the issued 
writs, the constable searched the defendants5 homes and business. IdL Notably, the writs 
were sought by the plaintiff "[u]pon filing its complaint," not after the court had 
determine whether the defendants had actually stolen trade secrets. IcL In essence, the 
plaintiffs writs for replevin and assistance were made in the context of discovery, just as 
in the present case. The court upheld the issuance of the writs in the face of a due process 
challenge. Id at 492. 
Similarly, under section 1116(d) of the Lanham Act, courts can issue an '"ex parte 
seizure order in civil actions alleging a trademark infringement that involves the use of a 
counterfeit mark.'" MRC Golf, Inc. v. Hippo Golf Co., 2009 WL 500637, at *1 (S.D. 
Cal., Feb. 26,2009) (citing In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 
2004)); see also Wangson Biotechnology Group, Inc. v. Tan Tan Trading Co., 2008 WL 
4239155, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2008). The purpose of the statutory provision is "'to 
preserve the evidence necessary to bring trademark counterfeiters to justice"' and 
"'protect the integrity of evidence in [a] pending civil action.'" MRC Golf, Inc., at *2 
(citing In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2004)). Congress added 
the ex parte seizure provisions to the Lanham Act because of the "propensity of 'those 
who deal in counterfeits . . . to destroy or transfer counterfeit merchandise when a day in 
court is on the horizon. The ex parte seizure procedure is intended to thwart this bad faith 
tactic, while ensuring ample procedural protections for persons against whom such orders 
are issued.'" Earth Products Inc., v. Gordo Enters. Inc., 2005 WL 3007125, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash., Nov. 9, 2005) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H12076 at 12080 (Oct. 10, 1984)). 
Ex parte discovery orders are also justified under statutes that provide for 
injunctive relief to prevent violations of the law, but which do not specifically authorize 
ex parte discovery orders. For example, in AT&T Broadband v. Tech Communications, 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004), AT&T obtained an ex parte order to seize Mr. 
Manner's business records because they alleged that he sold illegal cable descrambling 
machines that allowed buyers to obtain AT&T's cable service for free. Id. at 1311. The 
court allowed AT&T representatives, along with federal marshals, to enter, search, and 
remove business records relating to the sale of descrambling devices, including such 
information contained on "hard drives, servers, disks, and tapes," from Mr. Manner's 
residence. Id. at 1313. Notably, the court upheld the ex parte seizure order in the face of 
Mr. Manner's challenge to its constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1318 
n.12. 
The court in AT&T Broadband rejected the argument that ex parte discovery 
orders are inappropriate, absent explicit congressional authorization like that found in 
section 1116(d) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 1318. As justification, the court cited section 
553(c)(2)(A) of the Cable Communications Policy Act, which states the court may "grant 
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or 
restrain violations of subsection (a)(1) of this section." 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(A). The 
court held that the equitable remedy of an "ex parte search and seizure order directed at 
the defendant's residence" is consistent with the "district court's inherent equitable 
authority" and that, in the absence of some statutory limit on the district court's equitable 
authority, an ex parte seizure order was appropriate. AT&T Broadband, 381 F.3d at 
1318-19.13 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide ample authority for the use of ex parte 
discovery orders and court-authorized searches to protect property from potential 
destruction or misuse. Rule 64A and 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that the court may issue an ex parte orders in certain circumstances. In Fimab-
Finanziaria Maglificio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. 
Fla. 1982), the court issued an ex parte seizure order under Rule 65(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (similar to Utah's Rule 65A(b)) after the plaintiffs made a 
sufficient showing that notice "would be likely to result in the disappearance of the 
counterfeit FILA goods and related records . . . jeopardizing plaintiffs' ability to prevent 
irreparable injury, to stop the distribution of counterfeit FILA products, and to determine 
the source and extent of the defendants' dealings in the counterfeit FILA products." Id. 
at 249. The court acknowledged the existence of "burgeoning case law around the 
country which have recognized and approved as both appropriate and necessary judicial 
relief the granting of temporary restraining orders without notice, expedited discovery, 
and immediate seizure by the United States Marshal of counterfeit goods." Id. at 249 
(collecting cases). Notably, the court's expansive order allowed the plaintiffs attorneys 
13
 The Copyright Act also allows plaintiffs to move the court ex parte to impound 
equipment used for copyright infringement and records of the "manufacture, sale, or 
receipt of things involved in any such violation" "fa]t any time while an action under [the 
Copyright Act! is pending." 17 U.S.C.A. § 503(1); id at § 503(3). 
to accompany the United States Marshal to personal residences "to identify the 
counterfeit goods and . . . records" identified in the order. Id. at 250-51. 
Finally, multiple courts have exercised their general jurisdiction to protect 
property rights of parties through the issuance of ex parte seizure orders. See Joel v. 
Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (issuing an ex parte 
temporary restraining order authorizing the plaintiff to seize unauthorized merchandize, 
even though the defendants were yet unnamed); Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View Factory 
Outlet Corp., 770 F. Supp. 754, 760, 762 (D. P.R. 1991) (holding that the issuance of the 
ex parte seizure order was justified under multiple federal and state laws, the court's 
inherent equitable power, and the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure); AT&T 
Broadband, 381 F.3d at 1318-19 (holding that ex parte search and seizure orders are 
consistent with the "district courts' inherent equitable authority"). 
D. The Discovery Order is not Unconstitutional. 
Despite plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, ex parte seizure orders, like the one 
issued in this case, are not per se unconstitutional under either the Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution or under the Utah Constitution. As set forth above, seizure orders 
are routinely issued by courts—including orders that allow for the entry and seizure of 
material at a defendant's home.14 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue in their opening brief 
14
 In Owens v. Swan, 962 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Utah 1997), the court found no constitutional 
infirmity for an order allowing attorneys to enter a defendant's home. In Owens, Wells 
Fargo Bank, as a judgment creditor in an underlying civil suit, obtained a writ of 
assistance from a Utah state court authorizing its attorneys to enter the judgment debtor's 
home to inventory the contents. Id. at 1438. After execution of the writ, the judgment 
creditors asserted section 1983 and state law claims against the bank and its law firm 
(including an individual attorney) for conducting an allegedly unconstitutional search of 
their home. Id. at 1439. The district court dismissed the civil rights claims, holding that 
the defendants' entry into the debtors' home satisfied the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness standard for a civil case. "In the civil context... the standards of 
reasonableness are less stringent than in the criminal context.... Although notions of 
probable cause and specificity guide courts in the determination of the overall 
reasonableness of a civil search, they do not apply strictly in the case of an administrative 
or civil order of seizure." Id. at 1440. 
that the Discovery Order was unconstitutional because the "Utah Supreme Court 
expressly outlawed private search warrants." The authority cited by plaintiffs, however, 
does not support the conclusion that seizure orders aieper se unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs cite Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941), for the proposition 
that the Discovery Order was unlawful. The defendant in that case was a judge in the 
Second Judicial District in Davis County. The dispute centered on police seizure of milk 
bottles evidencing trade mark violations pursuant to a search warrant authorized under 
statute. IdL at 358. The Utah Supreme Court held that the search warrant was 
unreasonable under the circumstances and ordered the return of the milk bottles. Id. at 
364. The Allen court objected specifically to the use of a search warrant, "an essentially 
criminal procedure for the attainment of. . . civil ends." Id. at 361. Consequently, it 
voided the statutory provision that allowed the court to issue a search warrant for a 
purported trademark violation. Id. at 361. 
Significantly, the search warrant at issue in Allen improperly imported criminal 
procedures into a civil lawsuit; the search warrant was not styled as a discovery order 
issued pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, like those described above. Id. at 361. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff in Allen sought relief in the Utah Supreme Court by writ of 
prohibition to prevent further proceedings in the underlying action. IcL at 359. It was not 
an after-the-fact damages claim against an attorney. Accordingly, Allen v. Trueman does 
not support a damages claim like the one at issue here, and it does not prevent the district 
court from issuing an ex parte discovery order to obtain and secure critical evidence that 
is subject to concealment or destruction, like the computer evidence recovered in the 
Iomed case. 
In its sixty year history, Allen has never been cited for the proposition proposed by 
the plaintiffs — to challenge a discovery order reasonably necessary to preserve 
evidence. Nor has Allen been applied to challenge the execution of any of the ex parte, 
pre-judgment writs to protect property outlined in Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, section 13-24-6 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, or other like provisions. 
Plaintiffs also incorrectly argue that Judge Dee Benson of the United States 
District Court for Utah held that the Discovery Order was unlawful, and they incorrectly 
contend that the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from challenging that alleged holding. 
Judge Benson in fact held that the plaintiffs failed to state a civil rights claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. He therefore dismissed the civil rights claim for lack of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction and declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state claims. 
Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (D. Utah 2004), afFd 415 F.3d 1204 
(10th Cir. 2005), cert, denied sub nom. Yanaki v. Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & 
Loveless, 126 S. Ct. 1919 (2006) (the "Civil Rights Action"). 
The comments of Judge Benson on which the plaintiffs rely are no more than 
dictum in a footnote. Judge Benson's comments constitute neither findings of fact nor 
legal conclusions necessary to the disposition of the Civil Rights Action, and they are not 
binding on this court. Furthermore, the defendants were not required to appeal the order 
of dismissal in the Civil Rights Action in light of Judge Benson's dictum, because they 
were the prevailing parties. Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2005 UT 
App 279, Tf 4, 119 P.3d 302 (prevailing party need not appeal to preserve issues for future 
litigation). 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING TORT CLAIMS ALL FAIL AS A MATTER 
OF LAW ON THE PLEADINGS. 
In addition to failing because they are barred by the judicial proceedings and First 
Amendment privileges, and because the Discovery Order was not unlawful, each of 
plaintiffs' tort claims fails on the pleadings for the following independent reasons. 
A. Plaintiffs' Abuse of Process Claims Fails Because They Have Failed to 
Plead an Independent, Willful Act 
The Utah Supreme Court disfavors abuse of process claims because of the tort's 
"potential to impose an undue chilling effect on the ordinary citizen's willingness to ... 
bring a civil dispute to court." Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, f 59 (internal citations 
omitted).15 Because the abuse of process tort is disfavored, the Utah Supreme Court 
narrowly circumscribes its elements "so that litigants with potentially valid claims will 
not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent abuse 
of process . . . claim." Id. (internal citations omitted). The limited instances in which an 
abuse of process claim applies are outlined in Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, 147 P.3d 383. 
The "'essence' of the tort of abuse of process" is '"a perversion of the process to 
accomplish some improper purpose." Hatch, 2006 UT 44, f^ 34 (citing Crease v. Pleasant 
Grove City, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1974)). In order to prove the claim, the plaintiff 
must allege (1) "'an ulterior purpose'" and (2) "'a willful act in the use of the process not 
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.'" Id. 1136 (citing Hatch v. Davis, 2004 
UT App 378,1f 34, 102 P.3d 774)). Plaintiffs cannot meet these elements for two 
reasons. 
First, even though plaintiffs claim that they have pled an ulterior motive, they have 
not pled "a willful act" in furtherance of an abuse of process. Hatch, 2006 UT 44, ^ 33. 
Plaintiffs claim that the "ulterior motive" of the misuse of the legal process was to send a 
"message to its employees that they would be better off signing new agreements than 
leaving [Iomed] and risking their own homes being raided." (Opening Brief, at 15; R. 
131.) Despite the fact that this alleged motive has nothing to do with plaintiffs (Mr. 
Yanaki had already left Iomed and thus could not be the target of this alleged motive), 
plaintiffs have failed to plead a willful act in support of this alleged motive. As noted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, the willful act cannot be the "legal process that the tortfeasor 
15
 This is the precise policy reason for the broad application of the judicial proceedings 
privilege. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1258 (holding that the judicial proceedings privilege is 
designed to "ensure free and open expression by all participants injudicial proceedings 
by alleviating any and all fear that participation will subject them to the risk of 
subsequent legal actions"). 
pursues according to his ulterior motive." Hatch, 2006 UT 44, f t 37, 39. Without this 
independent requirement of a willful act, any litigation motivated by "spite, ill-will or any 
of the other less agreeable human emotions that frequently attach themselves to court 
papers" would form the basis for an abuse of process claim. Id, % 38. Thus, u[u]se of 
legal process with a bad motive alone" is not enough; "a corroborating act of a nature 
other than legal process is also necessary." Id. f 39. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the willful act element is "an obligation imposed on the complaining party to allege 
that the tortfeasor has confirmed through his conduct his improper ulterior motive for 
employing legal process against the plaintiff." Id. f 40. In this case, plaintiffs' abuse of 
process claim was appropriately dismissed because they have failed to plead any 
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corroborating willful act that is independent of the legal process. 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 682 cmt. b that "there is no action for abuse of process when the process is used 
for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an 
ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant." Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^ 49, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). The discovery motion and order 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is easy to slip into the conceptual trap of 
simply defining the 'willful act' as the legal process that the tortfeasor pursues according 
to his ulterior motive. Such a definition would, however, render the 'willlful act' 
requirement superfluous." Id. If 37. 
In support of their abuse of process claim, plaintiffs rely on Kool v. Lee, 143 P. 906 
(1913). Kool is distinguishable. In Kool the defendant met the first element of an abuse 
of process by filing a complaint "with malice and without probable cause," which caused 
the justice of the peace to arrest and confine the plaintiffs for a 20-hour period. Id at 906. 
In a "willful act" establishing the second element of the abuse of process claim, the 
defendant "directed his teamster to take a load of goods to the premises . . . to enter and 
take possession, and, if necessary, to set aside [the plaintiffs'] things." Id. at 908. When 
the plaintiffs were released from jail and returned to their homes, "they found the doors 
locked, themselves evicted and dispossessed, their goods in the shanty, and the defendant 
in possession." Id. at 908. Unlike the case at hand, in Kool, the court did not order the 
defendants to take possession of the plaintiffs' home or authorize the defendants' 
subsequent actions at any point in the course of the judicial proceeding. The repossession 
by the defendants confirmed the fact that they were acting with an ulterior motive. 
described in the First Amended Complaint were used to obtain and preserve evidence 
relevant in the lomed case. Because lomed's motion practice "was confined to its regular 
and legitimate function/5 and the order signed by the court was issued to preserve and 
obtain discoverable evidence, there was no abuse of process, even assuming plaintiffs 
could prove that defendants had an ulterior motive. See Keller v. Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (D. Utah 1995) (internal citations omitted), affM 78 
F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1996). 
It is significant that plaintiffs did not seek relief from the third district judge for 
the discovery abuses about which they complain in this lawsuit. In Watters v. Dinn, 633 
N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the defendant was an attorney who had represented one 
of the parents in a child custody dispute. The plaintiffs alleged abuse of process and 
invasion of privacy against the attorney on the ground that he improperly subpoenaed 
confidential mental health records of one of the plaintiffs without giving notice or 
opportunity to object. The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that the attorney had 
"abused the discovery process and was subject to sanctions in the trial court." Id. at 288. 
Nevertheless, the court held that the attorney's improper discovery procedures did not 
constitute abuse of process or invasion of privacy, irrespective of intent or motive, since 
the mental health records were discoverable in the child custody dispute and the attorney 
had a legitimate purpose for seeking their production. The court held that any abuse of 
the discovery process should be addressed, if at all, in the case in which the discovery 
took place. Id at 289; see also Kachig v. Boothe, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
(judgment obtained through perjured testimony did not give rise to claim for malicious 
prosecution, and any irregularity in the prior case should have been raised in that 
proceeding). 
lomed was justified in this case in seeking to obtain Mr. Yanaki's computer 
records and other files in a manner that would preserve them and prevent their 
destruction. If the Parr Law Firm committed any impropriety in representingits client in 
this endeavor (which they dispute), plaintiffs could have raised the issue in the underlying 
case before Judge Medley. They chose not to do so. They cannot now re-litigate the 
propriety of discovery orders entered years ago in another case. 
B. Plaintiffs' Claims for Invasion of Privacy and Trespass Fail Because 
the Parr Law Firm's Conduct was Undertaken in Compliance with a 
Court Order. 
In Utah, the torts of invasion of privacy and trespass require proof of the 
defendants' wrongful or unreasonable intrusion upon plaintiffs' privacy or land. The 
right of privacy may only be invaded by an "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652A (1977)). Court-ordered discovery does not constitute an unreasonable 
intrusion to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Big Five Cmty. 
Servs. v. Jack, 782 P.2d 412, 414 (Okl. Civ. App. 1989) ("We cannot say the copying of 
documents pursuant to court-ordered discovery constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into 
the seclusion of another so as to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy." 
(internal citations omitted)). 
Likewise, under Utah law, "trespass is a 'wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of 
another."5 Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) 
(emphasis added) (quoting O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 114 P. 127, 128 
(Utah 1911)). The entry complained of in this case was undertaken on the authority of an 
order entered by the Third District Court and therefore was not "wrongful" as a matter of 
law. 
C. Plaintiffs' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Fails Because 
Plaintiffs Did Not Allege and Could Not Prove "Extreme and 
Outrageous Conduct." 
To sustain to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must 
plead conduct on the part of defendants that is "extreme and outrageous." Prince v. Bear 
River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 38, 56 P.3d 524. Conduct does not fall within that 
category "simply because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give 
rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal." Id (internal citations omitted). The 
Utah Supreme Court has expressed caution with respect to claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress: 
Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and 
the variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of 
dangers in opening the door to recovery therefor. This is partly because 
such claims may easily be fabricated: or as sometimes stated, are easy to 
assert and hard to defend against. 
Bennett, 2003 UT 9, *| 59 (quoting Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2001 UT 25, f 25, 21 P.3d 198). In Bennett, the court held that allegations of 
improper use of legal process do not constitute a proper basis for a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Id ^ 66; see also Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, f^ 56 
(improper use of the legal process is insufficient to support a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). The First Amended Complaint in this case, therefore, 
fails as a matter of law to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.18 
D. Plaintiffs' Claim for Conversion Fails Because Mr. Yanaki's Computer 
Files Were Seized Pursuant to Court Order, and They were 
Maintained in the Custody of the Court. 
The tort of conversion has been defined as "an act of willful interference with a 
chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived 
of its use and possession. . . . It requires such a serious interference with the owner's 
right that the person interfering therewith may reasonably be required to buy the goods." 
Allred v. Hinklev. 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 
for conversion because the property at issue - computer files and documents relating to 
Iomed's trade secrets - was taken pursuant to court order, and then maintained in the 
custody of the court. Plaintiffs cannot establish that the interference was "without lawful 
1R 
Moreover, Mr. Yanaki was not present when the acts complained of herein took place. 
Utah law requires that a plaintiff asserting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on outrageous behavior be present and witness the act giving rise to the 
cause of action, absent some compelling circumstance such as child abuse. Hatch, 2004 
UT App 378, [^f 51-53. No such circumstances exist in this case, and Yanaki's claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed for that reason as well. 
justification." Pursuant to Judge Medley's Discovery Order, plaintiffs' attorneys had an 
opportunity to object to any material that was beyond the scope of discovery, but they 
made no such objection, and Mr. Yanaki was provided with copies of the materials 
retained by the court. The claim for conversion was therefore properly dismissed. 
E. Plaintiffs' Claim for Conspiracy Fails Because it is Unsupported by an 
Underlying Tort. 
To recover for civil conspiracy, the plaintiffs must prove, among other things, that 
the alleged conspirators committed one or more "unlawful, overt acts." Peterson v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, U 12, 42 P.3d 1253 (internal citations omitted). 
Without an underlying wrongful act, there can be no conspiracy: "[T]he conspiracy itself 
is not what gives rise to the right to action, but the torts committed in the furtherance of 
the conspiracy." Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As demonstrated above, the Parr Law Firm in this case did not engage in any unlawful or 
tortious conduct, and the claim for conspiracy was therefore properly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' tort claims. All of plaintiffs' tort 
claims arise from the Parr Law Firm's communications and actions in representing its 
client in the Iomed case. Specifically, the plaintiffs seek millions of dollars in damages 
in this case based on the Parr Law Firm's obtaining and implementing the Discovery 
Order seeking to preserve critical evidence for its client. Not only was the Discovery 
Order not unlawful as claimed by plaintiffs, but it was reasonable and necessary to 
preserve crucial evidence. Regardless of whether it was lawful, however, the Parr Law 
Firm's conduct in representing their client was privileged. A necessary corollary of the 
absolute privilege for written and oral statements made by an attorney is that attorneys 
must be free to take action that is specifically authorized by the courts before which they 
appear. For all of these reasons, this Court should affirm the dismissal of Counts II 
through VII of the Amended Complaint. 
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